Introduction
Theory maintains that the mispricing of futures contracts cannot be sustained in the presence of arbitrage trading by market participants. There is an abundant of empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of well established derivatives markets that operate in developed countries (Modest and Sundaresan, 1983 , Figlewski, 1984 , MacKinlay and Ramaswamy, 1988 , Yadav and Pope, 1990 , Bühler and Kemph, 1995 , Dwyer, et al., 1996 , Neal, 1996 , Tse, 2001 ).
However, the empirical evidence from emerging or newly established derivatives markets is less frequent.
As in the case of other developed European derivatives exchanges (see for example Bühler and Kempf, 1995 , who study arbitrage and mispricing for the DAX index futures), market conditions in the Athens Derivatives Exchange (ADEX) should not allow for large and long-lasting arbitrage opportunities. Sophisticated low cost traders (like market makers and large institutional traders) should be in the best position to exploit arbitrage opportunities. First, arbitrageurs can avoid tracking error because both index futures contracts traded are written on indices that are narrow and liquid (especially the FTSE/ASE-20 index). Second, they can replicate the index at favourable levels of transaction costs and within a reasonable span of time, minimizing at the same time execution risk in the spot market (see also Tse, 2001 , who examines futures index arbitrage for the Dow Jones industrial average). Finally, ADEX is operating a fully automated electronic trading system eliminating in this way the execution risk in the futures market.
The purpose of this study is to examine the profitability of index futures arbitrage in order to provide novel empirical evidence about the efficiency of the recently established ADEX. The establishment of a well functioning derivatives exchange is very important for the Greek capital market since it can improve the overall efficiency and information dissemination process; it can complete the market, contribute in price discovery and can also attract foreign investors that can benefit from the (emerging) characteristics of this market (see Alexakis et. al., 2007) .
Many issues that are addressed in this study contribute to our knowledge. First it is important to investigate whether the relationship between the index futures prices and the underlying stock indices can be described by the cost-of-carry model (Cornell and French, 1983) . It is also of great importance to examine whether futures mispricings can result to profitable arbitrage trading in the presence of market frictions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that directly validates (under market frictions) the index futures market efficiency of ADEX using high-frequency data for the period 2002 -2004 efficiency is examined by analysing the FTSE/ASE-20 index futures contract, the most liquid of the traded contracts; for completeness we have also consider the FTSE/ASE Mid-40 index futures which is the second most liquid contract.
Prior research has documented that derivative markets are less efficient at their early trading history and that the frequency and the magnitude of mispricings are diminishing over time (see Bühler and Kempf, 1995, Dwyer, et al, 1996 , and references therein). Thus a second interesting issue is to examine whether the price discrepancy between the cost-of-carry model and the market futures prices becomes less prevalent as time passes (indicating that the market becomes more mature over time).
Third, the efficiency of the derivatives market can have implications on the lead-lag relationship, on the hedging effectiveness (risk management) and on the price discovery mechanism. For example Lafuente and Novales (2003) discuss the estimation of optimal hedge ratios when there is discrepancy between the futures market price and its theoretical valuation according to the cost-of-carry model. So the investigation of the market efficiency can be informative and beneficial for market participants in the ADEX.
Finally, the interest on the properties and behavior of the ADEX is growing (i.e. Alexakis et al., 2007 , Kenourgios, 2005 , and other related references therein). These empirical studies concentrate on other issues of interest and employ different methodologies. Our study contributes to this line of research using a new dataset and derives results that are over and above of what has been already seen in the extant literature regarding the ADEX 1 .
Our primary results lead to the conclusion that index futures contracts offer profitable arbitrage opportunities, especially to low cost traders (like market makers and large institutional traders). The futures contracts present similar mispricing rates with transactions and closing data and they also exhibit cyclical mispricing patterns 2 , evidence that complies with the findings of Evnine and Rudd (1985) . We show that the frequency and magnitude of the futures mispricings remain the same even when stock index trading is delayed for at least 30 minutes 3 . We also extend the Gay and Jung (1999) theoretical model to account for the cost of borrowing stocks and for index tracking error. Despite introducing additional market frictions, we can still observe profitable arbitrage opportunities. At the end, using regression analysis, we identify additional factors that can explain the mispricing rates, such as time to maturity and market anticipated and unanticipated volatility.
The ADEX development is in accordance to other developed European markets (Kenourgios, 2005) . In addition, investors in Greece have become more aware of derivatives trading as evidenced from the increase in the volume of futures contracts. Despite this, arbitrage opportunities are still very large and persistent indicating that the market does not exhibit a maturation effect like other European derivatives markets (see Bühler and Kempf, 1995) . Our results indicate that for the period under investigation the ADEX has not attracted the attention of highly specialist and sophisticated traders that can act as arbitrageurs. We conjecture that most probably the market is dominated by the trading activities of hedgers 4 (similar conclusions are conjectured by Alexakis et al., 2007) . As suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) this might happen because specialized arbitrageurs (like large investment banks and hedge funds) avoid extremely volatile markets when they are risk averse and prefer large bond and foreign exchange markets where arbitrage opportunities are better exploited. Nevertheless, actions have to be taken in order to attract more investors that can act as arbitragers since as shown by Basak and Croitoru (2006) this can improve the risk sharing among investors and it can enhance the liquidity of the market. realized by derivatives are tax free.
Market Structure and Frictions for ADEX and ASE
[ Table 1 , here]
After June 2001, ADEX introduced stock repos (stock lending contracts) and stock reverse repos (stocks borrowing contracts) in an attempt to make short selling available to all investors. The contract size is fixed at 100 shares, the time period of the stock loan is limited to six months and any position in stock reverse repos bears a small non-fixed interest rate. Short sale proceeds from the stock reverse repos plus 50% of this amount is needed as an insurance deposit.
For the needs for our analysis we assume that all market participants can benefit from quasi-arbitrage trading (Gay and Jung, 1999, Fung and Draper, 1999 ), so we assume that the rate of availability of short sales proceeds equals unity. For the first part of our analysis we assume zero tracking error for taking a position in a comparable stock portfolio that replicates the index and we also ignore the cost of borrowing stocks. We examine the alternative assumption at a later stage by extending the Gay and Jung (1999) model.
Theoretical Model Prices and Bounds for the Futures Contracts
The cost-of-carry (CoC) model used to find the theoretical value of a futures contact, F t , at time t is defined as (Cornell and French, 1983) :
where is the current stock index level, is the time to maturity of the contract, and and represent the annual risk-free rate and dividend yield over the period . Gay and Jung (1999) have shown that in the presence of transaction costs and short sales restrictions, the no arbitrage price must lie within the following lower ( ) and upper ( F ) bounds:
and, 
Data Description and Analysis of the Mispricing Rates
We use intraday data to reduce any non-synchronous issues 10 (Bailey, 1989 , Figlewski, 1984 , Modest and Sundaresan, 1983 , Brailsford and Cusack, 1997 , Gay and Jung, 1999 . One (the nearest) and two (the upcoming) months to expiration contracts exhibit a tendency of underpricing relative to the theoretical CoC price.
Underpricing is observed in about 58% (69%) of the days for the nearest (upcoming) contract whereas overpricing is observed in only 35% (26%) of the days examined (significant underpricing is also reported by Bühler and Kempf, 1995, is in contrast to European and other international evidence that report that index futures markets become more mature and mispricing rates diminish over time (see Bühler and Kempf, 1995 , Dwyer et al., 1996 , and Brailsfort and Cusack, 1997 . Finally, from Table 2 is obvious that similar mispricing results are obtained regardless of the dataset considered. Arbitrage opportunities observed with the 15:30-dataset also persist with the closing prices dataset (see Evnine and Rudd, 1985 , who document similar patterns for put-call parity violations).
[ Table 2 , here]
We continue to check the economic significance of the arbitrage violations for low cost traders (market makers and large institutional investors) with ex-ante tests. In accordance to previous studies (Bühler and Kempf, 1995 , Neal, 1996 , Fung and Draper, 1999 , Tse, 2001 ), we assume that upon the identification of a significant mispricing, low cost traders can immediately trade the futures contract and take a position in the spot market with a time delay. Using evidence from previous studies (i.e. Bühler and Kempf, 1995, and Dwyer, et al., 1996) , two different time delay assumptions are made: i) one (1m) to five (5m) minutes after taking the futures transaction, and ii) use of same day's index closing prices (C).
[ Table 3 , here]
As shown in the Table 3 , profitable futures arbitrage opportunities persist in both frequency and level for the one (1m) to five (5m) minute cases. In the case of the nearest FTASE contract, when index trade execution is done with the closing price (C), there is a minor decrease in the number of futures overpricing and (especially) underpricing cases for both category of traders. This is in contrast to Bühler and Kempf (1995) who observe a large number of economically significant mispricings that disappear quickly because of arbitrage trading (see also Fung and Draper, 1999, and Tse, 2001 ). In addition, Dwyer et al. (1996) report for the S&P 500 futures that as the market becomes more mature (exchange trading history becomes larger) mispricing rates are exploited in a shorter amount of time. From unreported statistics we do not observe something similar in our case. This evidence is not necessarily striking but it can reveal a market that reacts slowly to profitable arbitrage signals.
To make the analysis more realistic we use the extended version of Gay and Jung (1999) model. First, and only for the market makers, we introduce the cost of borrowing stocks ( ). When market makers sell short stocks that were borrowed, 150% of the proceeds should be deposited in a margin account and as a result the short sales proceeds parameter is always zero ( br k m = 0). The cost of borrowing stocks is set equal to of the index value in order to reflect the opportunity cost of having 150% of the proceeds in a margin account earning no interest (see Ackert and Tian, 2001 , for a similar approach). For large institutional traders we use since they can always engage into (quasi) arbitrage trading with stocks that they already hold (a similar assumption is used by Bühler and Kempf, 1995 between 0 and 1% of the index level in order to approximate for other market impact costs that can result to tracking error. As suggested by Evnine and Rudd (1985) tracking error can exist even when index replication is performed with all stocks comprising the index (see also Bühler and Kempf, 1995, and Gay and Jung, 1999) . When tracking error is introduced, there is an additional decline in the number of futures mispricing cases for both categories of traders. For 1% tracking error, all overpricing opportunities disappear and there is a significant reduction in the underpriced cases.
Nevertheless, for relatively reasonable levels of market impact cost of around 0.4% 13 , futures underpricing cases are large in number and still economically significant.
Other Factors that Affect the Pricing of the FTASE Contracts
In this section regression analysis is employed to identify other factors related with the mispricing rates. As in Gay and Jung (1999) , (see also Brailsford and Cusack, 1997, Fung and Draper, 1999) 
In the above, is the mispricing rate for day t and is set equal to 0 if the time to maturity of the nearest (upcoming) futures contract is less than 14 (44) calendar days and to 1 otherwise (these values correspond to the average maturity of each contract class). is the Moving Average Convergence Divergence technical indicator and it is defined as the difference between a 26-day and a 12-day exponential moving average indicator. Moreover, ( ) is the Table 5 . All regression models are checked for serial correlation 14 up to the fifth residual lag based on the Breusch-Godfrey LM statistic (Godfrey, 1988) . The coefficient standard errors are estimated with White's (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
Daily market volatility is decomposed into anticipated and unanticipated using a twostep approach (see Zhang et al., 2005) . In the first step, an ARMA(2,1)-GARCH (1,1) specification (results are available upon request) is estimated using the FTASE/ASE-20 returns for the period 23/9/1997 to 31/12/2004 (call this Spec. #1). This is used to compute the daily market volatility via the fitted conditional standard deviation values of the model. In the second step, a volatility value is re-estimated daily using the above model specification based on prices beginning on 29/9/1997 and ending on the day prior to the day of each mispricing observation (call this Spec. #2). Using Spec. #2 we compute daily standard deviation return forecasts to estimate next day's anticipated market volatility ( ). In addition the difference between Spec.
#1 and Spec. #2 is used to estimate next day's unanticipated market volatility (σ ). 
[Tables 5, here]
From the results of Table 5 , the coefficients on the lagged mispricing rates are positive and significant. This indicates persistence of the mispricing and complies with evidence by MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988) . For the nearest and upcoming contracts the time to maturity coefficient is positive 15 most probably because the time to maturity effect is captured by the maturity adjusted volatility variables. Regarding the market trend variable, , it is marginally significant at 10% only for the nearest contract. This possibly indicates that futures mispricings are not affected by speculative trading that is related with the direction of the spot market. The anticipated volatility estimates are negative and statistically significant at 1% in both maturity contracts. In addition, the coefficient of the unanticipated volatility is negative and significant at 5% for the nearest to maturity contract and marginally insignificant at 10% for t MACD the upcoming contract. The latter evidence is probably induced by the emerging characteristics of the underlying market that may not at all time reacting rationally and thus reflecting all available information.
Conclusions
The results allow us to study the efficiency evolution of this new market. If we accept that the cost-of-carry model is a true approximation of the correct futures price, then we must consider the Athens Derivatives Exchange to be inefficient, at least during its early trading history. Even under more general assumptions about the prevailing market frictions, one can still observe economically significant mispricing cases.
The above analysis has different implications. First and most importantly, a significant dependence of the futures mispricings with volatility related variables has been identified by the regression analysis. This might imply that the futures market is dominated by the activities of hedgers (a similar conclusion is also reached by Kavussanos and Visvikis, 2007) who mainly wish to sell futures contracts in order to hedge their stock portfolio positions against volatility changes. Low cost traders like market makers and large institutional investors do not seem to actively engage in arbitrage trading in order to bring prices back to fundamental values. This might happen for various reasons like for example because of capital constrains (Tse, 2001, Basak and Croitoru, 2006) , because specialized performance based arbitrage is ineffective in the presence of different agency relationships between arbitrageurs and investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), or because low cost traders in ADEX require extremely high risk premia in order to exploit the arbitrage opportunities (Bühler and Kempf, 1995) . Moreover other market conditions that might have prevailed during this period − like the maturity, the size of the derivatives market and the limited number of derivatives products − did not help in attracting the attention of large (and foreign) arbitrage specialist.
Second, our results complement and support other empirical evidence documented for the Athens Derivatives Exchange. For example, Alexakis et al. (2007) find that informed investors are not indifferent between trading in the futures and the cash market since only information that is released by the cash market has as an effect on the futures behavior (the reverse does not hold); thus giving birth to exploitable arbitrage and hedging opportunities (see also Kenourgios, 2005) . Moreover, Lafuente and Novales (2003) show that when there is a systematic mispricing between the futures and the spot market the hedging effectiveness is optimized when using a lower number of futures contracts compared to the position taken to the stock index portfolio. Then our findings can offer an additional explanation why in the study of Kavussanos and Visvikis (2007) the minimum variance hedge ratio is significantly below unity.
The results indicate that actions should be taken that will eventually help increase the futures market efficiency by allowing additional investors (local and foreign) to participate in the market. In addition, the Athens Stock Exchange sometimes behaves as an emerging market with periods of aggressive rises and falls; so policy makers should find ways to further enhance liquidity and stabilize the spot market. Finally, the stocks borrowing mechanism seems to be under used by market participants; for the period we consider, the number of contracts that investors could trade was small and the number of stocks available for index short selling was limited. Therefore, any arbitrage trade could have been done only with a small number of contracts resulting to limited profits. Tables   Table 1 . Parameters related to the trading of the index and the futures contracts
Non-Exchange Members

Institutional Investors
Market Makers (14) 12 (14) 12 (14) FT40M 12 (14) 12 (14) 12 (14 The mispricing statistics concern 721 trading days for the two nearest to maturity future contracts of the FTSE/ASE-20 index. CoC represents the cost-of-carry model (under no transaction costs). In addition, Ind, Ins and MM refer to the mispricing rates for individuals (non-exchange members), large institutional investors and market makers (under transaction costs shown in Table 1 ). The upper part of each panel presents the frequency of mispricing rates and the lower tabulates the mean values of the mispricing rates. The mispricing statistics concern 721 trading days for the two nearest to maturity future contracts of the 
